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JURISDICTION
The

Court

of

Appeals

has

jurisdiction

over

this

case

pursuant to Section 78-2a-3(2) (f) of the Utah Code as an appeal
from

a

criminal

case

in

the

district

court

no

involving

conviction of a first degree or capital felony.
NATURE OF THE CASE
The appealant was convicted on three criminal counts in the
Third Judicial District Court in Salt Lake County.
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES
1.

Is a cautionary instruction sufficient when eyewitness

identification is an issue in a criminal case?
2.

Did Judge Young properly exclude expert testimony as to

eyewitness identification?
3.

Was the defendant improperly convicted and sentenced

twice for the same act?
4.

Is the punishment of 1 to 15 years proportionate to the

theft of merchandise valued at less than $30.00?
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS AND STATUTES
"Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines
imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted."

United

States Constitution, Amendment VIII.
"Excessive bail shall not be required, excessive fines shall
not be

imposed: nor shall cruel and unusual punishments be

inflicted.

Persons arrested or imprisoned shall not be treated

with unnecessary rigor." Utah Constitution Article 1, Section 9.
"A defendant may be prosecuted in a single criminal action
for all

separate

offenses arising out of a single criminal

-iii-

episode; however, when the same act of a defendant under a single
criminal episode shall estciblish offenses which may be punished
in different ways under different provisions of this code, the
act shall

be punishable under only one such provision; and

acquittal or conviction and sentence under any such provision
bars a prosecution under any other such provision."

Utah Code,

Section 76-1-402(1).
"Theft of property and services as provided in this chapter
shall be punishable as a second degree felony if the actor is
armed with a deadly weapon at the time of the theft."

Utah Code,

Section 76-6-412.
"Any person, except those persons described in Section 7610-503

and

those

persons

exempted

under

Section

76-10-510,

carrying a concealed dangerous weapon, as defined in Part 5, is
guilty of a class B misdemeanor,"

Utah Code*, Section 76-10-

504(1) subsections excluded.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Defendant was on put on trial on the 7th and 8th days of
March, 1989, before a jury for the charges of Retail Theft,
Possession
Appellant

of
has

a

Concealed

steadfastly

mistaken identity.

Weapon

and

Aggravated

Assault.

claimed

his

innocence,

claiming

The case against defendant was based on

eyewitness testimony by two security officers for Sears, Officer
Dial, whose testimony goes from page

3 to 69 of the trial

transcript, and Officer Maddox, whose testimony goes from page 70
to page 96 of the transcript, and a videotape of the perpetrator,
introduced into evidence on page 67 of the trial transcript.
-iv-

Defendant sought to have Edward Barton testify as an expert
witness

as

to

eyewitness

identification,

and

a

proffer

evidence was made, pages 116 to 136 of the transcript.

of

Judge

Young granted the prosecutions motion to exclude the evidence by
Mr. Barton.

Page 143 to 145 of the transcript.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS

Problems of unreliability of eyewitness testimony require
the admissability of expert witness testimony to assist the jury
in understanding scientific problems with that type of evidence.
Judge Young improperly excluded expert witness testimony in
that no adequate safeguards existed to protect defendant risks of
unreliable evidence.
Defendant was convicted twice for the same act.
Treatment of retail theft of an amount less than $30.00 is
disproportionate to the point of unconstitutionality.

-v-

ARGUMENT
1.

A cautionary jury instruction is insufficient in trials

where eyewitness identification is central to the case.
In recent years, there has been a growing acknowledgment
that

eyewitness

thought.

identification

is

not

as

reliable

as

once

The Utah Supreme Court took notice of the fact that

eyewitness

identification

is unreliable on the basis of the

general acceptance of that view by the scientific community.
State v. Rimmasch, 775 P. 2d 388 (Utah 1989).

Although the Court

did approve a cautionary jury instruction in State v. Long, 721
P.2d 483 (Utah 1986), that step did not go far enough to counter
public misperceptions as to eyewitness identification.
In discussing problems with misperceptions as to eyewitness
identification, the Court in Long stated,
Although research has convincingly demonstrated
the weaknesses inherent in eyewitness identification,
jurors are, for the most part, unaware of these
problems.
People simply do not understand the
deleterious effects that certain variables can have on
the accuracy of the memory processes of an honest
eyewitness. (citations omitted) Moreover, the common
knowledge that people do possess often runs contrary to
documented research findings, (citation omitted) Long
at 490.
The

question

then

arises

as to whether

the

cautionary

instruction, which lists criteria for the jury to consider in
evaluating eyewitness identification testimony, is sufficient.
If the common knowledge that people possess often runs counter to
scientific findings, how is the jury assisted by merely listing
variables to consider?

Without guidance as to the effects of the

several variables on eyewitness identification, isn't the jury no
1

better off than before?
The

Long

court

stated

that, "at a minimum, additional

judicial guidance to the jury in evaluating such testimony is
warranted."

Loner at 492.

The issue of expert witness testimony

as to the flaws and limits of eyewitness identification testimony
was not before the court in Long so the guestion as to whether
the minimum standard could extend in some cases beyond a mere
cautionary instruction was never reached.
Another

concern

mentioned

in

the Long decision

is the

concern of some courts that a cautionary instruction would amount
to improper judicial comment on the evidence.

Long at 492.

The

Court dispensed with that argument by stating that it could be
avoided by a careful drafting of the instruction.

An easier

solution

eyewitness

would

identification.

be

to

allow

expert

testimony

on

The adversarial system that is the hallmark of

our legal system would provide the jury, through effective crossexamination, with a clearer view as to the capabilities and
limitations on eyewitness identification.
2.

The reasons given by Judge Young did not justify the

exclusion of expert eyewitness identification.
The defendant was arrested and charged in this case on the
basis of an eyewitness identification that took place nine and
one half months after the crime.

The only other evidence to link

the defendant to the crime was the in court identification by the
other officer and a videotape.
Maddox

The identification by Officer

is suspect in that no lineup or other procedure was
2

utilized.

Officer Dial, the arresting officer, testified that

he viewed the videotape between 30 and 50 times,, Page 36 of the
trial transcript.
many

times, it

The problem is that after viewing the tape so
is

possible

that

the

identification

of the

defendant could possibly have resulted from his similarities to
the suspect on the video and not from any recollections by
Officer Dial.
Judge Young excluded the expert witness on the basis that
the eyewitness identification was aided by the videotape, the
jury could draw their own conclusions from the videotape and that
there were safeguards that already protected the defendant from
an improper identification.
transcript.

But,

determination

through

Pages 143 and 144 of the trial

whether
the

the

jury

videotape

can

make

their

own

does

not

affect

the

reliability of eyewitness testimony and is more of an argument as
to why the eyewitness testimony is not needed.

The quality of

the videotape becomes an essential part of this case at this
time.

The expert witness, Edward Barton, testified

in the

proffer of evidence that a videotape could re-enforce eyewitness
observations if the quality of the video or photograph was such
to

clearly

transcript.

identify

the

person.

Page

135

of

the

trial

The important factor is the quality of the video.

Judge Young evidently relied on this to exclude the testimony
without

making

videotape.

a

determination

as

to

the

quality

of

the

While the subject does bear considerable resemblance

to the defendant, the videotape
3

is not

so clear

as to be

determinative as to identity.

The nature of the black and white

picture and the distance of the subject from the cameras makes a
certain identification from the tape impossible.

The existence

of the tape is certainly an aid as to identification, but the
effect of the tape on the eyewitness identification is certainly
open to interpretation.

The tape, according to its quality,

either aids or prejudices the eyewitness identification.
The safeguards mentioned by Judge Young do not provide any
additional protection to defendant than in the usual instance and
are equally

adaptable

to exclude any evidence offered by a

criminal defendant.
First,

the

notion

that

a

defendant

is

protected

by

discretion on the part of a prosecutor is flawed in that it plays
into the argument that an accused is guilty or he would not be on
trial.

The second notion that the defendant is protected by

judicial suppression in the event of unreliability allows for
absolute judicial determination of reliability if the defense is
not allowed to bring out all issues that reflect on reliability.
There should be a recognition of a sliding scale of reliability.
Absolutely

unreliable

testimony

should be excluded, but all

issues that reflect on the reliability should be admissible.
threshold

test

unimpeachable.
examination

and

of

reliability
The

third

persuasive

should
safeguard

argument

not
of

render

A

testimony

effective

cross-

is good protection, but

counsel is prohibited from becoming a witness as to the various
problems with eyewitness identification.
4

The fourth safeguard of

the cautionary instruction has the problems stated above, i.e.
insufficient
variables.

instruction

as

to

the

interpretation

of

the

As to the fifth safeguard of the need for unanimity

for a jury verdict, a jury cannot be expected to sort out
unreliable evidence without some assistance.

The Long case

certainly points out the common misperceptions as to eyewitness
identification.

A

jury

tainted

by misperception

offers no

protection merely on the basis of the unanimity requirement.
As to the last safegucird, judicial relief from a conviction
applies only clear cut cases.
case.

The case at hand is a very close

There is quite a bit of resemblance between the defendant

and what you can make of the subject on the tape.

In cases such

as this, the need for assistance in interpreting the reliability
of the evidence and testimony is all the more important.
3.

The defendant was improperly convicted of and sentenced for

two offenses which involved one act by the perpetrator.
Defendant was convicted and sentenced for both Retail Theft
and Carrying a Concealed Weapon.

The Retail Theft conviction was

a Second Degree Felony pursuant to Section 76-6-412(1)(a)(iii) of
the Utah Code because of the possession of deadly weapon by the
perpetrator at the time of the theft.

Otherwise the offense is

a Class B Misdemeanor because the value of the stolen merchandise
was only $29.98.
Section 76-1-402(1) of the Utah Code provides in part that
"when the same act of a defendant under a single criminal episode
shall establish offenses which may be punished in different ways
5

under

different

provisions

of

this

Code,

punishable under only one such provision."

the

act

shall

be

The possession of a

weapon by the perpetrator is punishable as an enhancement to the
theft or as a concealed weapon.

For reasons of proportionality

set forth hereafter, the act should be punished as a concealed
weapon with the theft being reduced to a Class B Misdemeanor.
4.

The punishment of the theft of merchandise valued at $29.98

is so disproportionate as to be unconstitutional.
Both the United States Constitution and Utah Constitution
prohibit

cruel

and

unusual

punishment.

United

States

Constitution, Eighth Amendment and Utah Const. Art. 1 Section 9.
Encompassed within the concept of cruel and unusual punishment is
the

concept

of

proportionality

of the offense to punishment.

Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 103 S.Ct. 3001, 77 L.Ed. 2d 637
(1983) and State v. Bishop, 717 P.2d 261 (Utah 1986).
consider

in determining

proportionality

Factors to

of an offense to the

punishment include the gravity of the offense and the harshness
of the penalty.

Bishop at 269.

In general, it is accepted that

murder is more serious than other crimes and that crimes against
persons are more serious than crimes against property, and that
crimes

of

violence

are more culpable than those that do

not

involve violence. Bishop at 269.
In this case, the defendant was sentenced to 0 to 6 months
for the concealed weapon, to 0 to 5 years for pointing a weapon
at two persons, and to 1 to 15 years for stealing $29.98 worth of
merchandise.

Pages 154 to 156 of the District Court record.
6

Clearly, according to the criteria from Bishop, punishment of the
retail theft in this case is disproportionate.
CONCLUSION
Because of the need for expert testimony to assist the jury
in interpreting eyewitness identification occurring nine and one
half months after an incident and the lack of adequate safeguards
to protect the defendant, the conviction should be set aside.

In

the event that the Court will not set the conviction aside, the
conviction

of

retail

theft

should

be

changed

to

a

Class

B

Misdemeanor in the interests of proportionality.
Dated this 18th day of December, 1989.

Evan Hurst /
Certificate of mailing
I certify that I mailed four copies of the foregoing brief,
postage prepaid, first-class mail this 18th day of December,
1989, to:

Paul Van Dam
Sandra Sjogren
Utah Attorney General
236 State Capitol
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114

Evan R. H
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1

JUDGE YOUNG:

I WILL TELL YOU, GENTLEMEN, THAT

2

IT APPEARS TO ME THAT UNDER THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THIS CASE,

3

THIS CASE IS DISTINGUISHABLE FROM THE CHAPPEL CASE WHEREIN

4

THIS CASE INVOLVES THE POTENTIAL FOR THE JURY TO DRAW

5

CONCLUSIONS BASED UPON THEIR OWN OBSERVATIONS OF THE VIDEO-

6

TAPE WHICH SEEMS TO ME TO GIVE THEM A COMPARATIVE REFERENCE

7

THAT WOULD NOT OTHERWISE Bb AVAILABLE.

8

THE 1DFFICERS WHO HAVE IDENTIFIED THE DEFENDANT A REFRESHER

9

REFERENCE IF THEY PRESUME THAT THE VIDEOTAPE IS, IN FACT,

THAT ALSO PROVIDES

10

THE 1DEFENDANT.

11

PROVIDE TO THE JURY THE COURT DOES NOT FIND WOULD BE BENE-

12

FICIAL AND IN EXCESS OF THAT WHICH WOULD ALREADY BE PROVIDED

13

BY WHAT, AS I RECALL, WAS INSTRUCTION NO. 14 PROVIDED BY

14

THE STATE, PROPOSED BY THE STATE, AND, IN FACT, ADOPTED

15

BY THE DEFENDANT AND REQUESTED TO BE GIVEN.

16

GIVE THAT INSTRUCTION.

17

INSTRUCTION ON EYEWITNESS IDENTIFICATION.

18

PROVIDES SUFFICIENT CAUTION 10 THE JURY.

19

THUS, THE CAUTION THAT MR. BARTON MIGHT

THE COURT WILL

IT IS ABOUT A THREE OR FOUR PAGE
I THINK IT

I ALSO BELIEVE THAT THE SAFEGUARDS THAT HAVE

20

BEEN STATED IN THE CASE OF STATE V. HELTER BRIDLE FROM

21

MINNESOTA ON PAGE 547 OF THAT DECISION WOULD HELP THE DEFEN-

22

DANT TO BE SAFEGUARDED AGAINST AN IMPROPER IDENTIFICATION.

23

THOSE ARE LISTED AS FOLLOWS.

24

NOT NEED TO PROSECUTE IF THEY THINK THE EVIDENCE IS

25

UNRELIABLE.

FIRST, THE PROSECUTORS DO

IN THIS CASE THAT DECISION HAS PREVIOUSLY BEhN

lm

1

MADE.

2

SECOND, THE TRIAL COURT MAY SUPPRESS IDfcNTIFI-

3

CATION TESTIMONY IF THE IDENTIFICATION PROCEDURES RENDERED

4

THE EVIDENCE UNRELIABLE.

5

CASE.

THERE IS NONE OF THAT IN THIS

6

THIRD, EFFECTIVE CROSS-EXAMINATION AND PURSUASIVE

1

ARGUMENT BY DEFENSE COUNSbL ARE ADDITIONAL SAFEGUARDS THAT'S

8

BEEN ADEQUATE AND CAREFUL AND COMPETENT

9

OF, PARTICULARLY, OFFICERS DIAL AND MADDOX.

10

CROSS-EXAMINATION

FOURTH, PROPER INSTRUCTION OF THE JURY--AND THAT,

11

I THINK, WILL BE INCLUDED IN OUR INSTRUCTION NOW NUMBERED

12

14, MAY NOT BE NUMBERED THAT IN THE INSTRUCTIONS GIVEN.

13
14
15

FIFTH, THE REQUIREMENT OF THE UNANIMITY OF THE
JURY IS AN ADDITIONAL SAFEGUARD TO THE DEFENDANT.
FINALLY, THE COURT HAS THE POWER TO GRANT RELIEF

1«

IF IT IS CONVINCED THAT THE EVIDENCE, IF CONVICTED--EVIDENCE

17

OF A CONVICTED DEFENDANT'S GUILT WAS LEGALLY

18
19
20
2

INSUFFICIENT.

BASED UPON THOSE SAFEGUARDS THAT I THINK ARE
IDENTIFIABLE IN THIS CASE THE COURT RULES IN FAVOR OF THE
S T A T E — / S IT YOUR MOT/ON, A MOTION IN LIMINE TO SUPPRESS

* I THE RIGHT OF THE DEFENDANT TO TESTIFY?

22

MR. YBARRA:

23

JUDGE YOUNG:

IT IS, YOUR HONOR.
COURT GRANTS THE STATE'S MOTION

24

IN LIMINE AND DENIES THE REQUEST OF THE DEFENSE TO HAVE

25

MR. BARTON TESTIFY ON EYEWITNESS IDENTIFICATION.

I BELIEVE

144

THE JURY HAS SUFFICIhNT INFORMATION TO MAKh AN APPROPRIATh
DECISION.

ALL RIGHT.
Wfc WILL Bh IN BRIhF RhCbSS UNTIL Wh CALL THE

JURY IN.
(RECESS).

•I

JJ»S.

